(Continued from Part 9, previous blog post)
Nevertheless, besides Quebec politics there were at least two factors influencing Quebec premier Robert Bourassa not to accept Senate reform as in the July 7 Pearson accord.
One factor was the lack of a nationwide consensus on Senate equality, coupled with the interest of some (particularly Mulroney as earlier described) to abandon the Pearson accord and return to an unequal Senate model; In July, Mercredi had been given such persuasion by Liberal leader Jean Chretien: 472
“Mercredi met yesterday with Liberal leader Jean Chretien and constitution critic Andre Ouellet. The two federal politicians assured him that Quebec’s key concerns with the package centre on the proposal for an equal Senate, not aboriginal rights.”
Chretien sounded as if he had represented Quebec, but it was merely his view that Quebec’s key concerns with the Pearson accord were about equal Senate and not aboriginal rights. A few days later premier Bourassa’s aide Sylvie Godin stated that “major obstacles” Bourassa would like to address in the final negotiation included the equal Senate proposal, native self-government, and federal-provincial division of powers. 473
Bourassa and French Quebecers had concerns about “territorial integrity” when it came to native self-government. 474
Another factor for Quebec not to accept the Senate reform in the Pearson accord was that without Bourassa at the negotiation table the accord had given Quebec less compensation than given Ontario for the loss of Senate seats from 24 to 8: 10 additional Commons seats for Ontario’s loss of 16 Senate seats, and 3 for Quebec’s same loss – adjustments according to “the principle of representation by population”. 475
With Ontario’s 99 Commons seats versus Quebec’s 75, their respective 10-seat and 3-seat compensations were clearly out of proportion when compared to later New Brunswick premier Frank McKenna’s proposal of no-net-loss, full compensations.
When the final negotiation began on August 18, Bourassa revealed that he would indeed accept an equal Senate – despite his prior denials – but outlined conditions that amounted to limits on Triple-E – if Quebec senators were elected by Quebec National Assembly and if Senate powers were limited: 476
“Bourassa even suggested he could live with an equal, elected Senate — something he’s so far firmly resisted – as long as Quebec’s senators were elected by the National Assembly, rather than by the people, and as long as the new Senate’s powers were limited.
But Bourassa wouldn’t say yes or no to anything specific — an attitude other provincial officials found both frustrating and encouraging.”
Bourassa was unwilling to say “no” to Triple-E for fear that Alberta premier Don Getty might walk out of the negotiation. 477 His not being specific about limited Senate powers thus left it to others to suggest the “concrete terms” both he and the Triple-E supporters could accept.
Given that he now could accept Senate equality which he had publicly rejected (saying instead the Senate should be regionally equal), there should be likelihood that Bourassa would be open to at least some Senate veto power in general – when he had similarly said the Senate should only delay bills.
Bourassa elaborated further on his principles, that it was a matter of “the real power and authority conferred on the whole of the federal institutions”, and of examining “the different sharing out of powers and authority” to see “just what is to be the authority of the Senate”; he also emphasized the notion of “linguistic duality”: 478
“The problem of linguistic duality is there. It is linked to the authority and power of the Senate. What authority will we have in the new Senate? What will be the guarantees for Quebec as to the veto, language and cultural rights?”
As mentioned in an earlier part of this blog article, an argument advancing a more powerful notion of English-French duality had been put forward by Quebec’s Parti Quebecois government in 1982 in an attempt to block the Trudeau government’s repatriation of the Constitution, but that argument was unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada.
It would appear that the problem this time was less of “linguistic duality” but political opposition to Senate-veto power from Quebec’s separatist Parti Quebecois, which did not want the Senate as a powerful central institution at the expense of Quebec. 479
This time the Pearson accord guaranteed Francophone senators absolute veto power over legislations materially affecting the French language and culture – anywhere in Canada; that should be adequate for protecting the official French language as recognized in the 1982 Constitution and the French culture in English Canada where the French communities were of a minority status, namely in all provinces and territories outside Quebec (except New Brunswick where English and French were recognized as equal) as per the 1982 Constitution; 480 within Quebec, the French identity would not only be protected but actively promoted as part of the “distinct society” designation.
Carlton University political science professor Robert Jackson commented that in the reformed Senate it would take only three Parti Quebecois (or Bloc Quebecois) senators out of likely six Francophone senators to exercise this veto power. 481
With such padded constitutional protections for the French, the notion of linguistic duality ought to be based on the fact that English Canada comprised 8 (+ 1/2) provinces whereas French Canada comprised only one (+ 1/2) province.
Quebec certainly had a much larger presence in the Commons than would be of in an equal Senate, but to divert most matters not covered by the special Francophone veto, for that reason alone, to Senate-Commons joint sittings clearly risked negative reactions from English Canada – perhaps another reason Bourassa wasn’t suggesting the concretes of Senate-authority dilution.
As previously mentioned, the generous veto power to protect French language and culture had originated from an idea of Newfoundland premier Clyde Wells’s, intended for Quebec, during his opposition to the Meech Lake accord in 1990. It so happened that on one of the other “major obstacles” Bourassa wanted to address, namely aboriginal self-government rights being unspecific as in the Pearson accord, Wells – the proponent of a ‘pure’ Triple-E Senate – also had strong concerns, and among the nine premiers endorsing the Pearson accord had been the only one voicing objection: 482
“Wells told reporters that he can not support the inherent right to self-government without a clear definition.”
Thus, on the first day of the final negotiation Bourassa found himself opposite Wells on one major obstacle but allied on another (the latter “a strange de facto alliance” as noted by some): 483
“But it [Pearson accord] goes much further, proposing an elected, powerful Senate with equal representation from each province and offering Canada’s aboriginal peoples an undefined, inherent right to self-government — two things Quebec has problems with.
The aboriginal package still held Tuesday, although Quebec and Newfoundland expressed strong concerns.”
That would have put Wells in a position to craft compromises with Bourassa, helping Bourassa make aboriginal self-government rights more specific in exchange for Bourassa letting him keep some Senate veto power.
But if he had had such a plan, by the time final negotiation began on August 18 Wells had already abandoned it. According to an August 16 press report, Wells had indicated to other premiers on July 3 – days before the Pearson accord was reached to include a 70% Senate absolute veto on ordinary legislation – that he would accept joint sitting as the deadlock resolution between the Senate and the Commons, and would agree to give Quebec a veto on future constitutional changes to the Senate, Commons and the Supreme Court if the reformed Senate was acceptable to Newfoundland; at that crucial earlier time Wells was already willing to sacrifice Senate power in his fight against unequal senate models and Romanow’s model of equal Senate with unequal voting. 484
As previously mentioned, after Wells’s departure from the meeting on July 3 (to fly home to Newfoundland) a tentative deal was struck for an equal senate with a 75% absolute veto – without the “joint sitting” mechanism, not until Don Getty brought it in on July 7 for the 60%-veto level.
It’s hard to believe that Clyde Wells, the strong proponent of Triple-E Senate who then publicly called the Pearson accord’s Senate “not a true Triple-E”, but only “a good first start”, had quietly agreed to let others pull in another direction toward no effective Senate power in the Charlottetown accord.
After Bourassa’s rejection of the Pearson accord in July, wheeling and dealing led by New Brunswick premier Frank McKenna and Saskatchewan premier Roy Romanow along the line of McKenna’s no-net-loss model, that would also eliminate Senate-veto power on ordinary legislation, began rolling at full speed through July and early August, in order to present Bourassa with such a deal he would accept at the negotiation table, i.e, even if Bourassa didn’t specify what limitations he needed on Senate powers.
To gain wider acceptance for this kind of equal Senate – one with little real authority – McKenna made various accommodations to other provinces. Press reported that in the weeks leading up to the final negotiation, McKenna and his officials drafted various proposals, consulted other provincial officials by faxes and telephone, and capped the work with an extended session with Romanow the night before August 18. 485
The idea of additional Commons seats to compensate for loss of Senate seats had come from Ontario premier Bob Rae, whose province and Quebec otherwise stood to lose many parliamentary seats. 486
Alberta premier Don Getty’s initial reaction to the McKenna model was that it would be a hard sell for Alberta, Manitoba and Newfoundland, but he did not reject it outright as he did with Prince Edward Island premier Joe Ghiz’s unequal Senate proposal (previously discussed). 487
McKenna then proposed dropping the Pearson accord’s requirement of “proportional representation” for Senate election, instead allowing the provinces to choose their own method of electing the senators. 488 That obviously would permit Quebec to elect senators through its legislature.
A press story indicated that Getty was so opposed to proportional representation (as was Nova Scotia premier Don Cameron, both Tories) he was willing to see it dropped and in exchange not to oppose elimination of the 70% Senate absolute veto and full reliance on joint sitting for veto-resolution of ordinary legislation. 489
Before the formal negotiation began on August 18, the McKenna model had further evolved into the Modified McKenna model – proposed by Romanow and his justice minister Robert Mitchell – with an additional guarantee of 25% of Commons seats for Quebec no matter how small its relative population size would decline (Quebec’s population had been declining and was expected to continue to decline). 490
Like the McKenna model, the Modified McKenna model proposed Senate-Commons joint sitting as the sole Senate-veto resolution for ordinary legislation, the main difference being that McKenna’s would trigger a joint sitting at the level of a 2/3 veto while Romanow lowered it to 60%. 491
Recall that during the negotiation in June, prior to the Pearson accord, Romanow and McKenna had been keen on the Romanow model of equal Senate with unequal votes, but it was flatly rejected by Clyde Wells who called it “demeaning and insulting”; Boruassa reportedly had interest in that earlier model. 492
As the final negotiation began, other Senate reform proposals still competing with McKenna and Romanow were: Joe Ghiz’s unequal Senate plan that was close to Mulroney’s liking but rejected by Don Getty, Joe Clark’s proposal of interim adjustment of the current Senate with a few Senate seats, and several variations of equal Senate – barely reported by the media – including one from Getty based on McKenna’s; also, some premiers continued to hold the suspicion that Mulroney wanted the negotiation to fail so he could bring in his own unilateral plan. 493
But acceptance of Romanow’s Modified McKenna model (or no Senate deal) was likely a foregone conclusion – with only the details of “no-net-loss” compensations to be worked out and the guarantee of 25% Commons seats to Quebec to be agreed on.
According to some press reports’ stories of the negotiation meeting, Bourassa sat silently listening as a number of other Senate models were presented, then after Romanow presented the Modified McKenna model, Bob Rae turned to Bourassa and said that major concessions had been made to Quebec, at this point Mulroney called for the meeting to adjoin, but to others’ surprise Bourassa started to speak, stating he would like the guarantee to be 25% of all parliamentary seats. 494
Thus Bourassa began his formal negotiation of Senate reform by bargaining over Romanow’s proposed guarantee of seats in the Modified McKenna model.
In the end Bourassa did not get the more seats he asked for, but details of the math calculated by Manitoba premier Gary Filmon showed that after receiving the McKenna model’s no-net-loss compensation Quebec would have 25% of the MPs – the same as to be guaranteed permanently: 495
“In fact, one key figure in doing the calculation (“maybe because he’s an engineer,” observed one participant) was Manitoba Premier Gary Filmon, who worked out the details of taking 42 senators away from the larger provinces and adding 42 MPs in the House. Quebec now has 24.8 per cent of the parliamentarians and Mr. Filmon worked out that, with six senators each, Quebec would have 25 per cent of the MPs, and 24.8 per cent of Parliament in joint sittings.”
Even a strong Triple-E supporter like Manitoba’s Filmon became spellbound with joint sittings – at the expense of the Senate as an independent parliamentary institution.
Immediately after agreeing to the deal, Bourassa was happy to publicly highlight the fact that “joint sitting” meant less Senate power: 496
“”Most of the legislation, if it is stopped by the Senate, will go back to a joint session (of the Senate and Commons). In that joint session, Quebec will have 25 per cent of the political weight,” Mr. Bourassa said. “Of course, we could talk about an equal Senate, but when it is applied, we have to take account how it is applied.””
Many in western Canada felt the deal was a sell-out of the Triple-E Senate cause and, as phrased by then Reform party chief policy adviser Stephen Harper, viewed the 25% guarantee of Quebec’s share of Commons seats as “a giveaway” to Quebec for nothing or very little: 497
“”Would the 25 per cent (of Commons seats for Quebec) have sold if there was a genuine Triple-E (elected, equal and effective) senate? That’s an interesting question,” says Stephen Harper, the Reform party’s chief policy adviser. “I think most people don’t perceive the Senate as a big gain so they perceive the 25 per cent (of Commons seats for Quebec) as a giveaway for nothing or for very little.””
Even more disappointing was Newfoundland premier Clyde Wells, the former ‘pure’ Triple-E proponent; he was among the first (as was Ontario’s Bob Rae) to endorse Romanow’s guarantee of 25% Commons seats for Quebec, apparently without arguing for Senate veto power, proposing only to further lower the joint-sitting threshold from 60% to 50%. 498
Giving up Senate effective powers just for an equal Senate was all but ‘fait accompli’.
The famous Diane Wilhelmy tape – as in the Wilhelmy affair discussed in an earlier part of this blog article for its mention of David Cameron (i.e., husband of author Stevie Cameron who has relentlessly exposed corruptions in the Mulroney era) – also confirmed Bourassa’s listening more than talking, his having help from Mulroney and Rae, and even his ‘teaming up’ with Clyde Wells, during this final negotiation: 499
“He always works by thinking that Brian will do it, by thinking that Bob Rae will do it. He teams up with Wells. And he doesn’t talk, you understand? He wants to settle it bilaterally, or he passes off questions to the lawyers and thinks that they’ll do the clean-up work so that he can keep his mouth shut.”
The revelation by Andre Tremblay, Bourassa’s constitutional adviser, that Bourassa could count on Brian Mulroney or Ontario’s Bob Rae to do something, was not exactly a surprise; but Bourassa teaming up with Clyde Wells without the latter asking to preserve some effective Senate powers was somewhat unexpected.
For his shared concerns with Bourassa, Wells tried to make the native self-government right more concrete, to specify what it would not include, but his approach was shot down by Romanow: 500
“Mr. Wells was pushing for “negative lists” – that would spell out what aboriginal self-government did not apply to. But Mr. Romanow, a lawyer, said that a negative list wouldn’t solve the problem because it would imply that everything else was up for grabs.”
In the end, the concerns of Bourassa and Wells with regard to native self-government were addressed through mediation by Bob Rae, with Mulroney looking over his shoulder, between Bourassa and aboriginal leader Ovide Mercredi, leading to the Charlottetown accord provisions that the native self-government right “should not create new Aboriginal rights to land”, and that the courts when intervening should first focus on effecting “a negotiated resolution”; in any case Bourassa won it through Rae, whom and Romanow were the only premiers trusted by the natives according to Mercredi. 501
In addition to the guarantee of aboriginal Senate seats as in the Pearson accord, the Charlottetown accord tentatively proposed the mechanism of special veto by aboriginal senators on “certain matters materially affecting Aboriginal people”, 502 i.e., in the Francophone-veto style originated from Wells’s idea for Quebec, agreed on during the June negotiation as previously mentioned.
It seemed that Wells’s rival premiers not only gave away Senate effectiveness – to Bourassa’s preference – but gained native leaders’ trust as well.
While publicly acknowledging he had disagreements, Wells not only endorsed the Charlottetown accord’s Senate reform in but also praised Mulroney – his “long-time and bitter adversary on constitutional matters” – for reaching the accord, and even volunteered his help to solicit others’ support for it. 503
The unexpected emergence of a conciliatory and compromising Clyde Wells – in stark contrast to his past fierce stand against the Meech Lake accord (and his firm Triple-E stands in public prior to this time) – prompted Montreal Gazette columnist Don Macpherson to speculate, or rather mock, that this Clyde Wells was an “imposter”: 504
“Even the premier of Newfoundland was being flexible, leading one to wonder who the imposter was and what he had done with the Clyde Wells from the Meech Lake round of constitutional talks.
Imposter or not, Wells accepted an imperfect Triple-E Senate and even teamed up with Bourassa to get limitations placed on the right of aboriginal self-government. How many Quebecers, who have generally regarded Wells since the Meech round with the same visceral hatred that English Canadians reserve for Brian Mulroney, ever expected to see Wells as an ally?”
If the native leaders’ concessions on self-government could not be exchanged for Bourassa’s agreement to keep some Senate authority, what then happened to the third of the “major obstacles” which Bourassa’s aide Sylvie Godin had said Bourassa would like to address in the final negotiation, namely division of powers between the federal government and the Quebec government?
Bourassa’s demands for more Quebec powers were flatly rejected by prime minister Mulroney.
Division of powers was a much more important issue to Quebecers than Senate reform; the Jean Allaire report endorsed by Bourassa’s Quebec Liberal party in March 1991 had a list of 22 areas in which Quebec would like to have exclusive powers (jurisdictions) to be agreed to by the federal government. 505
The day after a tentative final deal was reached on Senate reform, Jean Allaire, author of the Allaire report, was quoted as saying that more Quebec powers was the principal demand of Bourassa’s Liberal party, although loss in the Senate would be a political issue for Bourassa: 506
“”Quebecers have never lost sleep over the Senate,” said Jean Allaire, whose report calling for Quebec control of 22 exclusive areas of jurisdiction became the party platform for Bourassa’s Liberals.
“Senate reform has never been the principal demand of the Liberal party. The principal demand is the division of powers,” Allaire said in an interview.
Bourassa may have difficulty selling a deal “if at some point Quebec would lose something in the Senate,” he said.”
Later on that day, Bourassa’s demand for more Quebec provincial powers was rejected by Mulroney and the other premiers: with only minor adjustments, the Pearson accord’s agreement on division of powers was adopted, and some provinces also told Bourassa that they had gone as far as or even beyond they could in reaching the July 7 agreement on division of powers. 507
Mulroney made a point of declaring that his government would never cede that many powers to Quebec: 508
“Mulroney frankly told Bourassa his proposals were “not in the realm of reality,” Mulroney’s chief of staff later told reporters.
“The Prime Minister indicated the traditional role of the federal government was not about to be vacated by this federal government,” Hugh Segal added.
Mulroney also reportedly told Bourassa the Quebec premier’s wish list was longer than that of the separatist Parti Quebecois in 1985.”
Despite Mulroney’s rhetoric, a reading of the Jean Allaire report and the Quebec Liberal party convention’s amending resolution – the latter contained clarifications on which of the 22 areas of powers Quebec wanted were already under Quebec control – would reveal that Bourassa had gained little new: Quebec already had full control in all but one of the areas declared in the Pearson accord (and in the Charlottetown accord) as to be in exclusive provincial jurisdiction, including municipal affairs, culture, tourism, labour market development and training (i.e., manpower and training), and forestry and mining (part of natural resources); the one exception was regional development, which was not in Quebec control and for which the federal government was willing to make an arrangement with a province if requested. 509, 510
A little more thought over Quebec’s list of powers has led me to believe that in some other areas of powers not in full control by Quebec at the time, the jurisdiction indeed could be transferred to the provincial level.
One such area was communications (apart from the area of telecommunications), i.e., media communications that delivered cultural contents; the following passage from the Charlottetown accord as applied to culture, after appropriate changes could probably apply to communications: 511
“Provinces should have exclusive jurisdiction over cultural matters within the provinces. This should be recognized through an explicit constitutional amendment that also recognizes the continuing responsibility of the federal government in Canadian cultural matters. The federal government should retain responsibility for national cultural institutions, including grants and contributions delivered by these institutions. The Government of Canada commits to negotiate cultural agreements with provinces in recognition of their lead responsibility for cultural matters within the province and to ensure that the federal government and the province work in harmony.”
A key distinction to make in the area of communications would be the different policies and regulations, provincial versus national, communication organizations needed to follow; e.g., local TV contents, operations and ownership – barring the aspects of telecommunications – would all be within provincial jurisdiction.
Another area Quebec could be given control was agriculture, even though it was a field traditionally dependent on federal control, such as the dependence in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta (and part of British Columbia) on the “monopoly” of the Canadian wheat board; the approach taken by the Charlottetown accord for the area of regional development, namely a separate agreement with a province at its request, could similarly provide the flexibility to let Quebec manage its agriculture development while retaining existent federal authority in other provinces. 512
Bourassa reportedly received a promise of future negotiations on power transfers to provinces that could be written into the Constitution later – they would be about further decentralization while maintaining provincial equality and not about ceding special powers to Quebec and entrenching them in the Constitution. 513
Overall, what he managed to do with each of the three “major obstacles”, i.e., accomplishing little in getting more provincial powers, agreeing to an equal Senate with its real authority taken away, and making native self-government rights more specific, when compared to their relative importance to Quebec served as further confirmation that Bourassa was led by Mulroney and others onto a path that – for the political interests of others and for Bourassa’s appeasement of Quebec sovereignty sentiments – sabotaged Senate effectiveness as a goal of Canadian Senate reform yet failed in terms of his federalist party’s fundamental objective of Quebec autonomy.
Belanger-Campeau commissioner Claude Beland clearly felt this way, who had participated in work on the commission’s report on sovereignty, released in March 1991 as previously mentioned, and who was president of Quebec’s co-operative movement and credit-union network: 514
“Claude Beland, president of Quebec’s co-operative movement and credit-union network, said that Quebec had been dragged onto English Canada’s negotiating turf.
Even federalist business leaders who testified before the Belanger-Campeau commission didn’t consider asking for a guarantee of 25 per cent of Commons seats as promised in the latest proposals. They wanted more provincial powers and an end to federal interference in Quebec’s jurisdictions, he said.”
As Claude Beland pointed out, Quebec didn’t ask for guaranteed percentage of Commons seats but wanted more provincial powers; yet Mulroney, McKenna and Romanow gave Bourassa a proposal of Senate with no effective Senate power, with an attractive additional guarantee on Commons seats to entice him to negotiate and agree, but otherwise would not give him at least some of what he really wanted – more provincial powers for Quebec.
Press reports indicated that Alberta premier Don Getty was probably the only premier who hesitated about elimination of the reformed Senate’s 70% absolute veto on ordinary legislation, loathing to accept proposals that would “soften a Triple-E Senate”; but Getty was ambiguous on what type of Senate model would be effective enough to make it Triple-E or on its relation to “the fundamentals of equality”. 515
One thing was clear though, that Getty was asked by his advisors to consider boycotting the negotiation at a time when the Modified McKenna model was the centre of attention; they reported told him: 516
“Get out of there. Don’t get into that kind of chasing.”
Getty was ambivalent about their advice and did not walk out, mentioning it only to show his displeasure with more erosion of Triple-E Senate (or more erosion on “the fundamentals of equality”).
Note that Getty had been the one bringing “joint sitting” into the Pearson accord in the first place, although he had proposed it for a veto level that otherwise would not be given power (i.e., when other mechanisms such as that of a ‘mediation committee’ were either not considered or not viewed as viable).
All aboard this proposal of Senate without real effective powers, except B.C. premier Mike Harcourt who had a new grievance and wanted to further the negotiation on Senate, but Harcourt’s problem was not with the Senate itself but with how new Commons seats were assigned in the McKenna no-net-loss model.
It turned out that the principle of no-net-loss was only for Quebec; for others the principle of representation by population was followed: after Quebec received 18 Commons seats as compensation for loss of Senate seats (from 24 to 6), Ontario also received 18 additional Commons seats but only because Ontario had been under-represented in the Commons; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick each would lose 4 Senate seats (from 10 to 6) and Prince Edward Island would get 2 more Senate seats (from 4 to 6), and that would convert to 6 more Commons seats which would instead be given to B.C., 4, and Alberta, 2, for their increased populations. 517
After the Senate deal was done on August 20, Harcourt realized that B.C. was still badly under-represented in the Commons, so he publicly complained about it and said the Senate deal could not be completed. 518
That of course was not re-negotiating the Senate part of the deal.
Harcourt’s misstep incurred criticisms in British Columbia; B.C. Tory senator Pat Carney, B.C. Liberal leader Gordon Wilson and Simon Fraser University political scientist Edward McWhinney all described Harcourt’s performance as “asleep at the switch”; Harcourt was also criticized for agreeing to the guarantee of 25% Commons seats for Quebec. 519
Senator Pat Carney even declared that Harcourt must change the agreement at any cost; it’s not clear if Harcourt heeded her call, but he later did get a promise that B.C. would receive more consideration in a future Commons-seat adjustment – to be speeded up to the mid-1990s. 520
As previously discussed, Harcourt had been a supporter of the NDP view of Senate abolishment, then advocated regional equality with B.C. as a region, before becoming a late convert of Triple-E Senate. Accused of selling out, Don Getty in neighbouring Alberta incurred much worse criticisms, with Reform party chief policy adviser Stephen Harper calling the Senate deal a “political dead end” for the western premiers who agreed to it. 521
University of Calgary historian David Bercuson called the reformed Senate a “PIE” instead of Triple-E, and future senators in it “a herd of cows”: 522
“It’s PIE with a cow in front of it: Partly elected, ineffective, and equal. And it will probably get as much done as a herd of cows in the afternoon.”
The “PIE” (or “PEI” to mean partly elected, equal and ineffective) marked the end of “Effectiveness” in the Canadian Triple-E Senate saga.
The “Pearson Accord” had received its name from the Lester B. Pearson building in Ottawa, where the July 7 deal had been reached under Joe Clark: the final negotiations under Brian Mulroney on August 18-22 were also held in the Pearson building. 523
The “Charlottetown Accord” and the final text of its “Consensus Report” became official during two days of meetings in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, August 27-28; prime minister Mulroney was the first to publicly refer to it by that name. 524
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